

ARM Research Summit 2018

Software Techniques for Hardware Defects

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Many thanks to collaborators:

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

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Reliability is the main design concern




- Main sources of hardware unreliability
 - Soft error, aka transient fault
 - Hard error, aka permanent fault



Soft error protection is required

- Soft errors: Historically, a problem for high-altitude applications
- ITRS 2015 predicts soon even ground-level applications will be at risk.
- Failure rate is expected to increase:
 - More components → more failures
- Solution: Redundancy
 - Hardware-level solutions
 - ARM Cortex-R Dual lockstep processor
 - Software-level solutions
 - Time redundancy (Flexible)



Software redundancy: flexible and effective

- Software-level redundancy: flexible error detection
 - No hardware modification
 - Can provide flexibility and selective protections
- Main approaches of software-level redundancy are

	Instruction-level redundancy	Redundant multithreading
Soft error	Can detect	Can detect
Hard error	Can not detect	Can detect

2-ways of software-level error detection

A. Instruction-level redundancy

```
data = data + 4  
data* = data* + 4
```



Replicates instructions

B. Redundant multithreading


Original Code
Thread 0
data = data + 4
data* = data* + 4

Thread 1
data* = data* + 4


Replicates execution thread



Instruction-level redundancy schemes




Examples: EDDI[2002], SWIFT[2005],
Shoestring[2010], DRIFT[2013], SIMD-Based Soft
Error Detection [16], IPAS [2016], nZDC [2016]



Examples: SWIFTR[2007], selective-
SWIFTR[2013], ELZAR [2016]

Redundant multithreading schemes

- SRMT: software-based redundant multithreading [Wang, CGO '07]




- COMET^[Mitropoulou, CASES '16], DAFT^[Zhang, IJPP '12]: Improves runtime
- [Wadden, ISCA '14][Gupta, DAC '17]: Applies SRMT to GPU
- RedThreads^[Hukerikar, IJPP '16]: Programmer-tunable SRMT for HPC

Experiment setup: SRMT error coverage


- **Benchmark: 9 applications in MiBench**
 - Original / SRMT-protected
 - ✓ Without hardware supports for inter-thread communication
- **Fault Injection on cycle-accurate gem5 simulator**
 - 6 components for fault injection
 - 1 error injection per 1 execution
 - ✓ 500 soft errors and 100 hard errors per component / benchmark
- **Fault coverage validation**
 - Main target: # of silent data corruption (SDC)
 - With correction factor^[Schirmeier, DSN '15] (# of SDCs * runtime * # of cores)

Experimental observation: SRMT error coverage

- Total: 27,000 soft error and 5,400 hard error injections
 - For unprotected application vs. SRMT-protected application
 - On average, SRMT requires ~3.9x runtime than unprotected
 - 2 cores are used for physically separated multithreading
 - Still, SRMT suffers from SDC (Silent Data Corruption)




Why SRMT suffers vulnerability?




- SRMT checking only checks old snapshot of registers
 - Incorrect execution of memory operation can be undetected
 - ✓ Vulnerable input replication & vulnerable output comparison

SRMT: Error cases

- Load in SRMT-protection



- Store in SRMT-protection



EXPERT: Removing Vulnerability from LOAD

- Replicating load operation on checker thread




NOTE: Checker thread access memory with its local register


- Soft error on load operation can only corrupt one thread
 - System can detect mismatch, as another thread is clean
- Checking for load operation is not necessary
 - Only store operation can propagate error effect
 - Mismatch will be found on later checking for store operation

EXPERT: Load-back checking against error


- If error corrupts data of store operation



- If error corrupts address of store operation




EXPERT: Reliable software-level RMT




EXPERT: Store Packing Optimization

Main Thread



Checker Thread




- **2-way sync for every store**
 - ~7.2x runtime on average
- If there is no dependency between ①, ②, and ③
 - Expert checking needs to keep
 - ① → ①
 - ② → ②
 - ③ → ③
- “Store Packing” is possible
 - If there is no memory dependency for both STORE and LOAD
 - ~43% performance improvement

Experiment: Setup

- Benchmark: 9 applications in miBench
 - Original / SRMT-protected / EXPERT-protected
- Fault Injection on cycle-accurate gem5 simulator
 - 6 components for fault injection
 - 1 error injection per 1 execution
 - ✓ 500 soft errors and 100 hard errors per component / benchmark
 - ✓ Total # of injections : 81,000 soft errors & 16,200 hard errors
- Fault coverage validation
 - Main target: # of silent data corruption
 - With correction factor^[Schirmeier, DSN '15] (# of SDCs * runtime * # of cores)

Experiment: SDC coverage validation



Conclusion

- Improved soft and hard error detection
 - With load-back checking & load replication on redundant multithreading
 - Additional sync scheme is needed
 - 65x better SDC coverage compared to SRMT
- Limitations
 - Runtime becomes ~5.0x on average, even with sync optimization,
 - SRMT: 3.9x on average
 - Can be improved with hardware support for communication
 - SDC cases on silent store

References


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- [Hukerikar, IJPP '16] S. Hukerikar et al., “Redthreads: An interface for applicationlevel fault detection/correction through adaptive redundant multithreading,” IJPP, 2016.
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Extra slides

Soft error and hard error

- Soft error: temporal bit flip


$$\begin{array}{rcl} \#1 & R_0 & = & R_1 & 2 & + & R_2 & 4 \\ \#2 & R_3 & = & R_4 & 4 & + & R_5 & 4 \end{array}$$



- Hard error: permanent bit fault


$$\begin{array}{rcl} \#1 & R_0 & = & R_1 & 2 & + & R_2 & 4 \\ \#2 & R_3 & = & R_4 & 4 & + & R_5 & 4 \end{array}$$

This adder always make last bit of result as 1




Silent Store Problem

- Silent store: if the previous value in memory is the same as data of store, store does not change memory
- If address of silent store is corrupted,
EXPERT can not detect memory corruption




EXPERT: Memory Coherence Problem

- In LOAD and STORE with same address



- In STORE and relative CHECKING



A closer look into SWIFT-R

Redundant computations

Majority-voter(val, val*, val**)
Majority-voter(addr, adr*, adr**)

store val → [addr]

```
if ((adr != adr*) || (addr != adr **) || (adr * != adr **)){
    if (adr == adr *)          // addr ** is faulty
        adr ** = adr;
    else if (adr * == adr **)   // addr is faulty
        adr = adr *;
    else if (adr == adr **)     // addr * is faulty
        adr * = adr;
}
```

movl -4(%rbp), %eax
cmpl -8(%rbp), %eax
.L2
jne .L2
movl -4(%rbp), %eax
cmpl -12(%rbp), %eax
.L2
jne .L2
movl -8(%rbp), %eax
cmpl -12(%rbp), %eax
.L6
.L2:
movl -4(%rbp), %eax
cmpl -8(%rbp), %eax
.L4
jne .L4
movl -4(%rbp), %eax
movl %eax, -12(%rbp)
jmp .L6
.L4:
movl -4(%rbp), %eax
cmpl -12(%rbp), %eax
.L5
jne .L5
movl -4(%rbp), %eax
movl %eax, -8(%rbp)
jmp .L6
.L5:
movl -8(%rbp), %eax
cmpl -12(%rbp), %eax
.L6
jne .L6
movl -12(%rbp), %eax
movl %eax, -4(%rbp)

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PR Tradeoffs from single thread to multi threads

