# P4 Executable Semantics and Symbolic Execution


## Didrik Lundberg

June 25 2024

# Import Tool

### **Import Tool**

\_\_\_\_



[1] Doenges, Ryan, et al. "Petr4: formal foundations for p4 data planes." POPL (2021)

#### **HOL4 JSON Parser**

\_\_\_\_

- Serialiser and deserialiser
- ~500 LoC in HOL4
- Can be compiled with CakeML
- Validated to obey IETF standard using SotA test suite<sup>[2]</sup>

#### **HOL4P4** Transformation

- From HOL4 JSON to HOL4P4 representation
- ~5000 LoC in HOL4
- Type inference of constants
- Program transformations
  - In-lining of nested blocks
  - Desugaring
- Custom option/exception datatypes

## **Executable Semantics**

#### **Executable Semantics**

- Used to evaluate n steps in the semantics
- Written to be CakeML-adjacent
- Soundness proved
  - ~1500 LoC
- Validated on standard test program suite

```
premises ⇒
rel_sem env st st'
```

VS.

exec\_sem env st = st'

# **Symbolic Execution**

#### Symbolic Execution

- Note: Overapproximating!
- Remember: No loops\* in P4
- HOL4 free variables as bits
  - o ... doesn't evaluate expressions with symbolic bits
- Path condition in assumption
- List of n-step thms as paths
- Naïve version quick to implement

```
path_cond ⇒
exec_sem env st(b1, b2, ...) =
    st'(b1, b2, ...)
```

#### **Symbolic Branches: Conditional**

If-statements with symbolic expressions

```
stmt_cond ((e_var "a") binop_and (e_var "b")) stmt1 stmt2
reduced to
stmt_cond (a /\ b) stmt1 stmt2
results in
a /\ b ⇒ stmt_cond T stmt1 stmt2
~(a /\ b) ⇒ stmt_cond F stmt1 stmt2
```

## Symbolic Branches: Table Application

Table application

... with known table configuration:

```
stmt_app "table1" [a]

[("table1",
        [1 |-> set_out_port(1),
        2 |-> set_out_port(2),
        3 |-> set_out_port(3)])]
adds to path conditions
a=1, a=2, a=3,{1,2,3}*a
```

#### Symbolic Branches: Table Application

Table application

... with unknown table configuration:

```
stmt_app "table1" [a]
```

#### tables

Must introduce fresh free variables:

```
?b1 b2 b3 b4. set_out_port(bitv [b1; b2; b3; b4])
```

#### **Overapproximation**


- Extern functions
  - o e.g. implementations of CRC-16 and IPv4 header checksum use copious word operations

```
?b1 b2 b3 b4. compute_checksum (bitv [a1; T; T; F]) =
  bitv [b1; b2; b3; b4]
```

#### **Big-Step Semantics**

\_\_\_\_

- Expressions: No function calls
- Statements: Only Seq, Assign
- Avoids layer transitions of the regular semantics



#### **Big-Step Semantics**

- Implementation size
  - ~500 LoC
  - Soundness ~5000 LoC
- On real-world programs, from ~3s to ~10ms per reduction
- Bespoke semantics versions, esp. incipits.
  - Minimizing the environment and state

#### Scalability: Numbers

\_\_\_\_

	Small	Medium <sup>[3]</sup>	Large
.p4 size	~100 LoC	~500 LoC	~10000 LoC
HOL4P4 size	~200 LoC	~1200 LoC	~20000 LoC
# Paths	12	20	*
Time	30s	12m30s	Hours

[3] F. Hauser et al., "P4-IPsec: Site-to-Site and Host-to-Site VPN With IPsec in P4-Based SDN," in IEEE Access (2020)

#### Scalability: Bottlenecks

- Bottlenecks
  - CBV\_CONV performing complex reductions (function call, ...)

EVAL' ``exec env st``

where env and st huge

#### Scalability: Bottlenecks

#### Bottlenecks


- CBV\_CONV performing complex reductions (function call, ...)
- MATCH\_MP in composition of execution

```
(path_cond ⇒
  exec env st n = st') ⇒
exec env st' = st'' ⇒
(path_cond ⇒
  exec env st n = st'')
```

#### Scalability: Bottlenecks

#### Bottlenecks

- CBV\_CONV performing complex reductions (function call, ...)
- MATCH\_MP in composition of execution



#### Concurrency?

- Stable enough for benchmarking
- Doesn't scale well with core count
  - ~40% speedup of IPsec example on 4-core laptop
  - ~30% speedup on 16-core stationary

#### **Future Work**

\_\_\_\_

- Verilog from P4
- Control Plane in CakeML

# Questions?